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The Maritime Law Association's Proposed Statute On
Shipowners' Limitation of Liability:
A Practical Alternative to the IMCO Convention
JOSEPH C. MARTUCCI*
I. INTRODUCTION
From the time of its enactment, the Limited Liability Act' has
been the topic of both great praise 2 and scathing criticism. 3 The Act
was originally passed in an effort to put American shipowners on an
equal footing with their foreign counterparts, particularly the British.
Since its passage, however, there has developed an almost universal
recognition that the purposes and underlying justifications for the
promulgation of the doctrine in 1851 no longer exist. 4 In addition,
while there have been dramatic changes in the maritime industry in
the past century, particularly, technological achievements in maritime
commerce, the almost universal use of marine insurance, and the cre-
ation of numerous causes of action for death and personal injury since
passage of the Act, there have been no major modifications of the
doctrine in over forty years. Notwithstanding these facts, both ship-
owners and insurance interests have defended the Limitation Act as a
necessary subsidy which makes it possible for the United States
maritime industry to remain competitive in the marine transportation
market with most other maritime nations of the world which maintain
a system of limited liability.
The above changes in the maritime industry, changing contem-
porary attitudes favoring compensation to the injured, and the cre-
* J. D. Degree Candidate 1979, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. West
Chester State College 1976. Mr. Martucci is the Special Features Editor of the
Lawyer of the Americas.
1. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635.
2. Roberts, For Retention of Limitation of Liability for Shipowners, 1968 A.B.A.
Ins. Section 415; Ross, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Revisited, 10 S. TEX. L.J.
1 (1968).
3. Comment, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability and Personal Injuries: A Need
for Re-evaluation, 48 TUL. L. REV. 376 (1974); Adler, For Abolition or Liberalization
of Present Limitation of Liability Statutes, 1968 A.B.A. Ins. Section 409; Comment,
Limitation of Liability: An Anachronism from the Days of Privity, 10 VILL. L. REV.
721 (1965); Eyer, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old
Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370 (1964).
4. Id. See also Volk and Cobbs, Limitation of Liability, 51 TUL. L. REV. 953
(1977).
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ation of new causes of action for death and personal injury, all have
led courts to the realization that the underlying rationale which
prompted passage of the Act in 1851 no longer exists.5 This realiza-
tion has in turn resulted in unsuccessful judicial attempts to modify
the Limitation Act in order to meet contemporary needs through
juridical restriction of the limitation privelege. 6 This juridical restric-
tion, both substantive and procedural, fails to promote the best in-
terests of tort claimants, shipowners, insurance underwriters, or the
United States public policy.
The primary vehicle for this judicial restriction of the benefit of
limitation has been an increasing judicial attitude to find "privity or
knowledge" on the facts of the case, thereby denying limitation.
Under section 183 of the Act, the shipowner's right to limit liability is
conditioned on his being without "privity or knowledge." 7  Similarly,
under section 182 of the Act, the owner is exonerated from liability to
cargo for fire damage unless the fire was caused by the owner's "de-
sign or neglect." 8  Gilmore and Black have appropriately described
these requirements:
5. In 1954, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1953), Justice
Black, in his dissent for four members of a 4-1-4 divided court, expressed what seems
to have become the predominant judicial attitude toward limitation of liability:
Judicial expansion of the Limited Liability Act at this date seems
especially inappropriate. Many of the conditions in the shipping industry
which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act no longer prevail. And
later Congresses, when they wished to aid shipping, provided subsidies
paid out of the public treasury rather than subsidies paid by injured per-
sons. If shipowners really need an additional subsidy, Congress can give it
to them without making injured seamen bear the cost ...
Id. at 437. See also In Re Jacobson, 52 F.2d 179 (S.D. Tex. 1931). The purpose of
the Act is to encourage shipowners to send good, first class ships to sea. This is
defeated if it is allowed to furnish protection to owners from the consequences of an
ill-advised and ill-considered venture; the Santa Rosa, 249 Fed. 160 (N.D. Cal.
1918). The statutes (limitation) are to be enforced in such spirit and with such liberal-
ity as will effect their purpose-the encouragement of shipbuilding and the employ-
ment of ships in commerce. But such liberality should not be carried to an extent
that will deprive cargo owners and passengers of that degree of care on the part of
those owning and operating ships which their safety demands and to which they are
entitled; Place v. Norwich Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) (Matthews dissenting)
The statute, as it has been construed, puts a premium on the destruction of property
by taking away from shipowners a principal motive for regarding either their own or
the interests of others.
6. Of 19 reported limitation petitions between 1973 and 1976, limitation was
denied in all but four cases. See Greenman, Statistical Analysis of Limitation Cases,
1953-October 1976, Maritime L. Ass'n of U.S., Doc. No, 600 (1976).
7. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1958).
8. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1958).
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"Privity or knowledge" and "design or neglect" are phrases
devoid of meaning. They are empty containers into which the
courts are free to pour whatever content they will. The statutes
might as well say that the owner is entitled to exoneration from
liability or to limitation of liability if, on all the equities of the case,
the court feels that the result is desirable, otherwise not. 9
9. GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 877, § 10-20 (2d ed. 1975).
One of the more in depth discussions of the requirement can be found in Complaint
of Farrell Lines (The African Neptune), 530 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the
court held a shipowner entitled to limit liability where his vessel struck a bridge due
to the navigational error of a ship's helmsman. The court stated that the resolution of
whether a shipowner is entitled to limit liability involves a two step process. First,
the court must determine what acts of negligence and/or conditions of unseaworthi-
ness caused the accident. Second, the court must decide whether the shipowner had
knowledge or privity of such negligent acts or unseaworthy conditions. The court
held that the shipowner's pre-accident knowledge of alleged inadequate shipboard
procedures, personnel andor equipment which may have caused the accident was
not enough to deny the shipowner his right to limit liability, if such procedures,
personnel or equipment did not in fact involve negligence or render the vessel un-
seaworthy. A comparison of the African Neptune with other privity or knowledge
cases reinforces Gilmore and Black's conception of the standard. Despite the court's
well reasoned test, the problems exist in all limitation cases of what exactly privity or
knowledge entails in a particular fact pattern, and of determining just what specific
acts of negligence were committed against which the admiralty court will sub-
sequently apply the privity or knowledge standard. Thus, the privity or knowledge
standard is so elastic that it provides the judiciary with a mechanism to support a
decision, in most cases, for either party, that is in reality arrived at by a judicial
balancing of the equities in the case at bar. There is little doubt that the facts of the
African Neptune could have been interpreted to deny limitation under the standard
enunciated by the court, Given the absence of an additional watch oicer, the im-
proper positioning of the vessel's rudder angle indicator, and that both the shipowner
and the master knew prior to sailing of the extremely tricky navigational task that lay
ahead in sailing down the river, requiring that a high degree of care be exercised in
the ship's approach to and clearance of the bridge, not only could the shipowner have
been in privity or knowledge of a failure to keep the vessel in a seaworthy condition,
but in privity or knowledge to the negligent failure to apprise those aboard of the
dangers to be encountered and how to best minimize them. See also Complaint of
Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, 440 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (The owner had
a duty to excercise due diligence to keep the vessel in a seaworthy condition, and
was charged with knowledge of the corrosion that would have been uncovered by a
thorough investigation, Since the shipowner did not, and could not, exhaust all the
conceivable explanations for the power failure, for this ground alone the petition for
limitation of liability must be denied); Hamilton v. Canal Barge Co., 1977 A.M.C.
2274 (E.D. La. 1977) (Limitation denied for failure to prove absence of privity or
knowledge of sub-demisee who knew of the corroded condition of the mooring bitt,
and that the inland barge, which was neither designed nor certified for offshore oper-
ations, was being used offshore); Cerro Sales v. Atlantic Marine, 1976 A.M.C. 375
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Ocean carrier denied limitation for loss and damage to cargo where
it had knowledge and privity as to the cause of the shipboard fire); In Re Hi-Wal Sea
Rambler, 1970 A.M.C. 1449 (E.D. Va. 1970) (Owner of vessel involved in a collision
who knew of the defective condition of the automatic pilot held guilty of privity
resulting in a denial of limitation); In Re Marine Sulphur Queen, 1970 A.M.C. 1004
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A second judicial restriction of the availability of limitation has
been the tendency to equate the standard of care in the Limitation
Act with the higher standards under the Harter Act' 0 and the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)."1 Although the older cases dis-
cerned different standards for "design and neglect" and "privity or
knowledge, "12 the more recent cases have treated the terms as virtu-
ally equivalent so that if the right to exoneration under those Acts is
lost, the right to limitation vanishes as well. 13 Thus, if the present
.judicial trend of restricting the availability of limitation continues, the
standard of care in the Limitation Act could become superseded by
the higher standard of care in Harter and COGSA with respect to
cargo claims. 1
4
The growing judicial hostility toward shipowners' limitation of
liability can be explained by a combination of factors rather than
merely the predilictions of justices on the federal judiciary or a
Lochnerized approach to substantive due process. 1 5  First, the pre-
sent Limitation Statute operates in most instances to deny an other-
wise valid recovery to an injured party. Such a result is diametrically
opposed to society's demand for increased protection and compensa-
tion for injured claimants in all fields of the law. This result is also
contrary to the new remedies created in admiralty to protect the very
people denied a meaningful recovery by limitation of liability. At the
time the Limited Liability Act was passed seamen were precluded
from recovering for injuries sustained as a result of their master's neg-
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), 460 F.2d 89, 1972 A.M.C. 1122 (2d Cir. 1972) (Limitation of liabil-
ity denied to owner and bareboat charterer of a tanker that sank in Gulf of Mexico
with all hands, where knowledge of the unseaworthy construction of the tank bulk-
heads was possessed by both the owner and charterer).
10. 27 Stat. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1958).
11. 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1958).
12. See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 9 § 10-21 at 879.
13. E.g., Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman' Wilson Line, 287 U.S. 420 (1932);
Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1934); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Lloyd Brasileirs, 159 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1947); Accinanto, Ltd. v.
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 99 F. Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1951), reversed in part 199
F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 992 (1953); Complaint of Caldas, 350
F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie de Navigation
Fraissinet, 345 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) aff'd, 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. See GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 9 § 10-21 at 878-79.
15. In this respect "Lochnerized" refers to the strict judicial analysis of legislative
means-ends relationships and the underlying philosophy that the only valid govern-
ment actions where those which promoted the "general welfare" rather than the
promotion of private interests. See Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 8-1 to
8-7 (1978).
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ligence. 16  In 1920 however, Congress undercut Justice Brown's
fourth proposition in The Osceola 17 by passing the Jones Act", which
permitted a seaman injured in the course of his employment by the
negligence of the owner, master, or fellow crew members to recover
damages for his injuries.
Second, at the time of the Limitation Statute's enactment, the
seaman's right to recover for injuries caused by an unseaworthy ship
was unknown in American admiralty law. In fact, the earliest opinions
dealing with the concepts of unseaworthiness appeared in the context
of mariners suing for their wages where they were required to prove
the unseaworthiness of the vessel to excuse their desertion or mis-
conduct which would have otherwise resulted in a forfeiture of their
right to the wages.19 However, in Carlise Packing Co. v. San-
danger,20 the Supreme Court stated, "We think . . . the trial court
might have told the jury that without regard to negligence the vessel
was unseaworthy when she left the dock . . . and that if thus unsea-
worthy and one of the crew received damage as the direct result
thereof, he was entitled to recover compensatory damages." 21
This statement, along with Justice Brown's much quoted second
proposition in The Osceola,22 which was dictum in that case, led to a
substantial increase in litigation for damages based on unseaworthi-
ness unrelated to negligence. This was further augmented when it
became clear that the plaintiff did not have to elect between his Jones
Act and unseaworthiness actions. 2 3
A third significant development since the passage of the Limita-
tion Act has been the evolution of wrongful death actions. In The
16. See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
17. Justice Brown's fourth proposition stated that the seaman is not allowed an
indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any member of the crew, but is enti-
tled to maintenance and cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or
accident. Id. at 175.
18. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
19. See The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755 (D. Pa. 1789).
20. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
21. Id. at 259.
22. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable
to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthi-
ness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in good order the proper appliances
appurtenant to the ship. 189 U.S. at 175.
23. See McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949). Un-
like most propositions of Admiralty law, this was not started by the Supreme Court
in the first instance but at the Circuit level in an attempt to reconcile two previous
Supreme Court decisions.
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Harrisburg2 4 the Supreme Court ruled that there was no cause of
action for wrongful death under the general maritime law. However,
consistent with the current judicial attitude of affording remedies to
injured plaintiffs, in 1970, the Surpeme Court explicitly overruled
The Harrisburg in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc 2 5 and held in
a unanimous opinion that the general maritime law provided a rem-
edy for wrongful death. In addition, Congress passed the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 26 which provides a recovery for death
caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas
beyond one marine league from the shore of any state or territory.
Another development since the promulgation of the Limitation
Act, further contributing to its obsolescence, has been the rise and
almost universal use of marine insurance. While the exact origins of
marine insurance are unclear, it is believed to have developed along
with the corpus of admiralty law during the Middle Ages.2" Al-
though the use of marine insurance was slow to develop in the
United States, today most maritime risks are insured. 28  The result is
that in many cases it is the profit oriented insurance company rather
than the shipowner who is attempting to reap the benefits of the
Limitation Act.2 9 In addition, the technological developments in
maritime transportation since the promulgation of the limitation doc-
trine have not only reduced the shipowner's risk of loss, but have also
increased his control over the vessel even after it has left port.
The net effect of the aforementioned developments, along with
the growing acceptance of the corporation as a form of doing business
and single ship incorporation, is that the theoretical reasons for pas-
sage of the Limitation Act and the early justifications for its liberal
interpretation are no longer valid. The present limitation doctrine op-
erates in nearly all cases to deny an otherwise valid recovery. As a
result, the sole justification of limited liability today is its subsidy
24. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
25. 398 U.S, 375 (1970).
26. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1970).
27. See Kierr, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P & I Insurance, on Vari-
ous Other Insurances of Maritime Liabilities, and on Limitation of Shipowner's Lia-
bility, 43 TUL. L. REv. 638 (1969).
28. See generally Volk and Cobbs, supra note 4. Watson, infra note 30.
29. One of the major factors taken into consideration by the P & I underwriters is
the shipowner's ability to limit liability in the event of a catastrophe. Libby, Some
Aspects of Protection and Indemnity Insurance, 1952 INs. L. J. 684, 689. See also
Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969); Ema v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 353 F. Supp. 1286 (D.P.R. 1972).
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value to the maritime industry in permitting shipowners to maintain
lower shipping costs and remain competitive in the international
maritime market. This subsidy is afforded to maritime transportation
because limitation permits shipowners to pay less than fair and full
compensation for the personal injury, death, and cargo damage that
they exact in the course of their operations. This is, however, both an
unusual and unjust subsidy as it is paid from the pockets of seamen,
widows, children and injured victims.
Past discussions of limited liability have failed to evaluate and
balance the competing claims and interests of the various parties with
a stake in the outcome. Such tunnel vision analysis has resulted in an
all or nothing approach to limited liability, advocating either complete
abolition of limited liability or ratification of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Convention, 30 with
neither position advancing the best interests of the United States. A
priori, with the drafting of the IMCO Convention on Limitation of
Liability 3 ' and the Maritime Law Association's proposed statute and
Rule F, 32 the time has come to evaluate carefully the underlying
reasons and policy considerations for limitation of liability in order to
develop a comprehensive doctrine that serves the best interests of all
concerned parties.
In an effort to resolve the aforementioned problems in the status
quo, and to keep pace with modern economic reality, this article will
explore the possible alternatives open to the United States: retention
of the current doctrine; complete abolition of shipowner's limited lia-
bility; ratification of the IMCO Convention; or enactment of the
Maritime Law Association's proposal for domestic legislation. Follow-
ing a comparison of the IMCO Convention with the Maritime Law
Association's proposed statute, the article will conclude with a rec-
ommendation for enactment of the Maritime Law Association's (MLA)
proposed statute as the only doctrine that effectively deals with all
the major issues of limitation of liability and which equitably balances
the interests of concerned parties.
30. See Volk and Cobbs, supra note 4; Watson, The 1976 IMCO Convention: A
Comparative View; 15 Hous. L. REV. 248 (1978).
31. For the text of the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims, 1976, see 8 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 533 (1976); 1977 A.M.C. 1607 (June 1977)
(hereinafter cited as The Convention).
32. For the text of the Maritime Law Association's proposed statute on limitation
of liability, see Appendix A of this article (hereinafter cited as The Act).
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
II. COMPARISON: THE IMCO CONVENTION AND
THE MLA PROPOSED STATUTE
Following the work of the Comit6 Maritime International (CMI),
IMCO held a conference in 1976, which produced the Convention on
Limitation of Liability. 33 The United States delegation refused to
sign the Convention. Following a considerable expenditure of time
and manpower, the Maritime Law Association of the United States
developed proposed federal legislation to deal with the problem of
limited liability. Because the Maritime Law Association's (MLA)
proposal incorporates necessary and substantial modifications to the
limitation doctrine, which could not be obtained through ratification
of the Convention, an analysis of the significant provisions of both
proposals is presented below.
A. Standard of Care-Privity or Knowledge
A significant improvement over the current United States limita-
tion doctrine, provided by both the IMCO Convention and the MLA
statute, is the abandonment of the flexible privity or knowledge for-
mula. In its place both the Convention and the MLA statute substi-
tute a requirement of a "personal act or omission committed with the
intent to cause the loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such
loss would probably result." 3 4
The use of "privity or knowledge" as a requirement for limitation
proceedings is an anachronism. Although the vagueness of the terms
provides room for judicial interpretation, as a result of judicial hostil-
ity toward limitation of liability, shipowners and insurers are unable
to depend on the standard when planning their maritime services,
rates, and insurance premiums.35 The result leads to uncertainty in
both the maritime and legal spheres, which require a high degree of
certainty for their effective operation. As such, the shift to the intent
or wilful misconduct standard by both the IMCO and MLA proposals
is a much needed change.
B. Burden of Proof
A second significant change in the standard of care from current
U.S. limitation law is that the IMCO Convention shifts the burden of
33. See note 31 supra.
34. The Act, supra note 32, art. 4.
35. Watson, supra note 30 at 271.
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proof of conduct that will bar limitation from the shipowners to the
claimants. 3 6  The Maritime Law Association has not taken an official
position on this issue to date, and thus has developed two alternative
proposals; one which places the burden of proof on the claimant
3 7
and the other which places the burden of proof upon the petitioner
seeking to limit liability.3 8  For the following reasons, it is submitted
that the Maritime Law Association should support the second alterna-
tive and place the burden of proof upon the party seeking to limit
liability.
The proposed version of Article 4 of the MLA statute that would
allocate the burden of proof upon the claimant states: "A party liable
shall not be entitled to limit liability if it is proved that the loss re-
sulted from its personal act or omission committed with the intent to
cause such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss
would probably result."39 In contrast, the version of Article 4 of the
MLA statute which would place the burden of proof upon the party
seeking limitation states: "A party liable shall be entitled to limit its
liability unless the loss resulted from its personal act or omission
committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss would probably result."
40
The difference between the above proposal and the first alterna-
tive, which follows the wording of the IMCO Convention and places
the burden of proof on the claimant, is that the above proposal omits
the words "if it is proved." Because of that omission, United States
courts would probably interpret the statute as imposing the burden of
proof upon the party seeking to limit liability. This result is desirable
for several reasons. First, as a practical matter, the determination of
eligibility for limitation is seldom decided solely on the basis of bur-
den of proof. The careful limitation petitioner presents all the evi-
dence supporting his claim for limitation, allowing the court to base
36. The language "if it is proved" casts the burden of proof upon the party chal-
lenging the petition for limitation. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 4.
37. A party liable shall not be entitled to limit its liability if it is proved that the
loss resulted from its personal act or omission committed with the intent to cause
such loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result. The
Act, supra note 32, art. 4.
38. A party liable shall be entitled to limit its liability unless the loss resulted
from its personal act or omission committed with the intent to cause such loss, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result. The Act, supra
note 32, art. 4.
39. The Act, supra note 32, art. 4.
40. Id.
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its decision on the evidence presented regardless of the allocation of
the burden of proof.41 Thus, in most cases this shift in burden of
proof will do nothing to help the limitation petitioner.
Second, the only conduct that will bar limitation under both the
Convention and the MLA proposal is a "personal act or omission
committed with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss would probably result." 42 Thus, the stan-
dard of care is tantamount to intent. Because both proposals establish
such an iron clad defense, the beneficiary of this extraordinary de-
fense should bear the burden of proving his eligibility to assert it.
Further, in cases where the exact cause of the loss is unknown,
the allocation of the burden of proof is determinative of the outcome
of the petition for limitation. Under the Limitation Act and the sec-
ond porposal of the MLA statute, when the exact cause of the loss
cannot be established, it is impossible for the shipowner to prove that
the loss was from a cause for which he was without privity or knowl-
edge; thus limitation is denied. 43  However, in the identical fact pat-
tern under the IMCO Convention or the MLA's first alternative,
limitation would be granted since placing the burden of proof upon
the claimants would make it impossible for them to prove the requi-
site fault or intent to bar limitation. 44 It is submitted that any
change placing the burden of proof upon the claimants is ill advised,
particularly since the beneficiaries of this defense are being given a
virtually unbreakable standard.
Limitation of liability is an affirmative defense. 45  As such, the
burden of proof should fall on the moving party,. the shipowner, to
establish his lack of wilful misconduct or intent. Since limitation's
major justifications today are that of a subsidy to shipowners and a
device to ensure commercial insurability, the beneficiaries of this de-
fense should carry forth the burden of proof on an issue which they
contend to be vital to both the nation's economy and the future pro-
priety of their own enterprises. Finally, any change in the burden of
proof requiring the claimants to prove intent or wilful misconduct
41. Commentary on the proposed Limitation of Liability Act, Maritime Law As-
sociation (Sept. 20, 1978) at 6-9. [hereinafter referred to as Commentary].
42. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 4; The Act, supra note 32, art. 4.
43. Martin & Robertson, Ltd. v. The Barcelona, 1968 A.M.C. 331, 334 (S.D.
Fla. 1967). The Court held "that the cause of the loss of the S.S. Barcelona not
having been established, it cannot be found that the loss of the S.S. Barcelona was
from a cause without the actual fault and privity of the owner and/or charterer.
44. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 4.
45. Terracciano v. McAlinden Const. Co., 485 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1973).
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could arouse strong opposition to passage of the statute from those
that believe that equity requires the beneficiary of an affirmative de-
fense to prove his eligibility to assert it.
C. Persons Entitled to Limitation
Unlike the Limitation Act which restricts the right of limitation
to shipowners, bareboat charterers, and owners pro hac vice, 46 the
IMCO Convention extends the benefit of limitation to the owner, 4 7
manager and operator, 48 master,4 9 members of the crew,50 salvors, 5 1
insurers,5 2 all charterers, 53 and any person for whose negligence or
default the shipowner or salvor would be liable under the terms of
Article Two.54 Likewise, the MLA proposal expands the category of
persons entitled to limit liability in three important areas: 1) salvors;
2) all charterers, managers or operators; and 3) insurers. 55
1. Charterers
Although as a practical matter demise charterers would more
often be in a position to incur liability, 56 the extension of limitation to
all charterers would provide a more rational approach than the pres-
ent system. It is uncommon for a shipping line, during a period of
short tonnage, to supplement its own fleet with time or voyage char-
tered vessels. If one of those vessels became involved in a maritime
catastrophe in which the shipping line and not the vessel owner were
liable, under the present U.S. doctrine, the shipping line would be
denied the right to limit liability. However, if the identical disaster
occurred to a vessel owned or demise chartered, then limitation
would be available. Thus, under the status quo, the availability of
limitation is not commensurate with possible liability, but is based, in
46. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1970).
47. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 1, para. 1.
48. Id., art. 1, paras. 1, 2.
49. Id., art. 1, para. 4.
50. Id.
51. Id., art. 1, para. 1.
52. Id., art. 1, para. 6.
53. Id., art. 1, paras. 1, 2.
54. Id., art. 1, para. 4.
55. The Act, supra note 32, art. 1.
56. The demise charterer is viewed as the owner pro hac vice. Thus, he warrants
the seaworthiness of the vessel, is regarded as the "employer" for purposes of liability
under the Jones Act, and is responsible for the negligence of his crew. See GILMORE
AND BLAcK, supra note 9 § 4-23 at 242.
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part, on the status of the vessel in question. 57 Since the charterer in
most cases will be purchasing marine insurance in the same market
and against the same risks as the shipowner, although at different
premiums, extension of the benefit of limitation to this class of seafar-
ers is necessary to keep up with modern economic realities.
2. Masters and Members of the Crew
One of the more disturbing aspects of IMCO's liberalization of
the benefit of limitation is the Convention's extension of the right to
limit to all masters and members of the crew.5 This expansion is
based on the Convention's language granting limitation to "any per-
son for whose act, neglect or default the shipowner or salvor is re-
sponsible." 59 For the reasons set forth below this expansion is over-
broad and thus restricted in the MLA proposal.
First, extension of limitation to this class of employees is based
on the dubious assumption that their employers, the shipowners,
would rush to their assistance if sued.8 0 However, while this as-
sumption might be valid in reference to small claims, it is extremely
doubtful that such loyalty would be exhibited in a situation where the
potential liability was enormous.6 1 Ironically however, it is only in
those latter situations when limitation will arise since it is only appli-
cable when there has been a catastrophic loss.
Second, one of the traditional reasons for limitation was to en-
courage the risk of investment in a hazardous activity.62 However,
there is no evidence to demonstrate that this expansion of the benefit
of limitation is necessary to encourage seamen to go to sea. 63
Third, extension of limitation to masters and members of the
crew will do nothing to assure shipowners commercial insurability or
a competitive position in the international maritime transportation
market.64
57. Watson, supra note 30 at 253-54. See also Palmer, Liability "As Owner of the
Vessel Named Herein": Coverage of Liability of Non-Owners, 43 TUL. L. REv. 481
(1969).
58. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 1, para. 4.
59. Id.
60. Watson, supra note 30 at 255.
Q1. Id. at 255-56.
62. The purpose of the Act is "to encourage shipbuilding and to induce capitalists
to invest money in this branch of industry." Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 104, 121 (1871).
63. See Watson, supra note 30 at 255-56.
64. In most cases these persons would not be listed as insureds in the P & I
policy. Thus it would have little impact on the cost of insurance premiums.
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Since extension of the benefit of limitation to masters and mem-
bers of the crew would not promote any of the underlying justifica-
tions for the doctrine, this expansion is unwarranted. Considering the
growing concern for providing adequate compensation to tort claim-
ants, such innocent parties should not be barred from recovery by
expansion of a doctrine which promotes neither the underlying justifi-
cations for limited liability or a sound governmental interest. The
only beneficiaries of such an extension of the right to limitation would
be masters and crew members, who would secure a windfall at the
expense of tort claimants. Thus, the Maritime Law Association was
correct in its conclusion that this aspect for the IMCO Convention is
too broad to be acceptable for domestic legislation.a 5
3. Insurers
In an obvious attempt to protect insurance companies from direct
action statutes, both the IMCO Convention 6 6 and the MLA proposed
statute 67 extend the benefit of limitation to insurers. Despite Mr.
Burr's analysis, 6 8 this author strongly disagrees with the contention
that direct action statutes are a loophole in the present U.S. limita-
tion doctrine. It is the author's opinion that it is both unnecessary
and unwarranted to extend the benefit of limitation to insurers. As
such, it is hoped that the final version of the MLA statute to be
submitted to Congress will not extend the right of limitation to insur-
ers.
Under the current U.S. doctrine, in jurisdictions with a direct
action statute, 69 a claimant may bring suit against the insurer without
joining the assured (shipowner) as a party defendant, "whether the
policy of insurance . . . was written or delivered in the State of
Louisiana or not and whether or not such policy contains a provision
forbidding such direct action, provided that the accident or injury
occurred within the state of Louisiana." 70 The statute is thus an
65. Commentary, supra note 41 at 3.
66. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 1, para. 6.
67. The Act, supra note 32, art. 1, para. 5.
68. Burr, Limitation of Liability, 10 LAw. AM. 799 (Winter 1978).
69. See id. at 805-08.
70. La. R.S. 22:655 (1968) provides in part:
The injured person or her survivors or heirs . . . shall have a right of direct action
against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy . . . and said action may
be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and insurer jointly
and in solido .... This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insur-
ance sued upon was written or delivered in the state of Louisiana or not and whether
or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the
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express manifestation of the state's policy that "all liability policies
• . .are executed for the benefit of all injured persons to whom the
insured is liable." 7 1
The case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing 72 brought before
the Supreme Court the question of the inter-relationship of marine
insurance, direct action statutes, and limitation of liability. In May
1950, five seamen drowned in the Atchafalaya River when their vessel
collided with a concrete bridge pier and capsized. Following their
challenge to the owner and charterer's petition for limitation, the de-
cedent's survivors brought a separate action in the same United
States District Court against the insurer of the shipowner under
Louisiana's direct action statute in an attempt to reach the proceeds
of two insurance policies. Justice Clark's opinion broke the 4-4 dead-
lock and became the mandate of the Court.73 Convinced that the
Limited Liability Act was intended to afford protection only to ship-
owners and charterers, since Congress had made no mention of in-
surers, Justice Clark determined that the direct action against the
insurance company would be permitted but would be stayed until
completion of the limitation proceeding. Thus, Justice Clark's resolu-
tion of the case provided substantial security to both claimants and
shipowners. The claimants were given the possibility of recovering
the full amount of the insurance while the shipowners were permitted
to satisfy the claimants in the concursus out of the insurance proceeds
before the claimants were entitled to attack those proceeds directly.
This ensured that it would be a rare occasion when the shipowner
would be denied the benefit of his insurance.
Despite the divergence of opinions in Cushing, all nine members
of the Court did agree that the insurers should not be extended the
right to limit liability. Whatever doubt there may be regarding the
accident or injury occurred within the state of Louisiana ... It is the intent of this
section that any action brought hereunder shall be subject to all of the lawful condi-
tions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer
to a direct action brought by the insured, provided the terms and conditions of such
policy or contract are not in violation of the laws of this State.
It is also the intent of this section that all liability policies within their terms and
limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons . .. to whom the insured is
liable.
71. Id.
72. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
73. The case was originally heard by an even numbered bench of eight Justices
because Mr. Justice Clark was sitting on the War Trials at Nurenberg. The split
decision was rendered by reargument of the case after Mr. Justice Clark returned,
with the original eight Justices split 4-4.
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ultimate issue of direct actions because of a badly fractioned Court, it
is well settled that insurers will be denied the right to limitation
under the present U.S. limitation doctrine.
The most recent attempt to reconcile the murky waters following
the Supreme Court's badly fractioned decision in Cushing was the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing
Company, Inc. 74 In that case the Fifth Circuit held that direct ac-
tions were permitted against insurers, but that the limitation court
should use both its law and equity jurisdiction to ensure that the
insurance fund was not exhausted before the shipowner would receive
the benefit of his insurance.
It is difficult to see how the allowance of direct actions against
insurers amounts to a loophole in the doctrine of limitation of liabil-
ity. First, as stated in Norwich v. New York Transportation Co. v.
Wright,7 5 the accepted rationale for the creation of limitation in the
United States was "to encourage capitalists to invest money in this
branch of the industry.'" 76 It is extremely doubtful that it is neces-
gary to extend limitation to insurers to encourage their investment in
this industry. Likewise, extension of limitation to insurers is unneces-
sary to protect shipowners from the possibility of bankruptcy resulting
from a catastrophic maritime loss. Shipowners' limitation of liability
itself protects against that very contingency. Further, it must be re-
membered that under the present U.S. limitation formula, claimants
often will be seeking recovery from a very small limitation fund.
Thus, taking into consideration modern attitudes favoring compensa-
tion to the injured, it is not suprising that in many cases either limita-
tion is denied or a direct action permitted so that these claimants will
receive a meaningful recovery.
For two reasons, it is submitted that this issue should be re-
solved by not extending the right of limitation to insurers. First, as
noted above, extension of limitation to insurers is not necessary to
encourage insurers or shipowners to invest their capital in this indus-
try. Nor would the extension of limitation to this group promote
shipping, trade or commerce. Second, it is not necessary to extend
the benefit of limitation to insurers to guarantee commercial insurabil-
ity for shipowners and charterers. The insurability argument is based
on the reasoning that the liability risks for various maritime adven-
74. 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969).
75. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
76. Id. at 121.
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tures are immense, yet the market in which insurance coverage can
be purchased is limited. Therefore, as the argument proceeds, it is
technically impossible to obtain sufficient insurance to cover all possi-
ble risks. However, even if it were theoretically possible to insure to
the maximum limit of potential liability, it would be "commercially
impossible" to purchase this insurance. 77
The extension of limitation to insurers, however, is not the solu-
tion to this problem for several reasons. There is no evidence to show
that if insurers' liability were limited, those parties entitled to limita-
tion would insure to the maximum limit of their potential liability.
None of the supporters of ratification of the IMCO Convention have
demonstrated that there would be any practical change in the pur-
chasing of insurance coverage by extending limitation to insurers.
Thus, the possibility certainly exists that even if insurers were
granted the right to limit liability, there would be no change in cur-
rent insurance practices, and such right would secure a windfall for
insurers. Second, at present it is alleged that the cost of purchasing
maximum coverage is too high to be included within the price for
maritime services. However, under the present U.S. limitation doc-
trine, most petitions for limitation have been denied in recent
years. 78 Thus, this increase in potential liability must eventually
manifest itself in both higher insurance costs and consumer prices. A
limitation formula which guaranteed a high degree of certainty to
shipowners in limiting their liability, however, would permit them to
purchase greater insurance coverage for reduced premiums and
thereby pass on to the consumer the cost of full insurance without
substantially increasing existing prices for maritime services.
In construing limitation of liability as a personal defense of the
shipowner and those seeking coverage in the marine insurance mar-
ket for the same risks as the shipowner the courts promote both the
purposes of limited liability and the demand for increased compensa-
tion to injured claimants while restricting the availability of an un-
popular doctrine. In sum, extension of the benefit of limitation to
insurers would advance neither the reasons for the doctrine's enact-
ment nor the justifications for its continuance. Thus, it is hoped that
the MLA statute would be amended to exclude insurers from the
benefit of limitation.
Because the Maritime Law Association's proposed statute pro-
vides an adequate limitation fund, there is no need for claimants to
77. See Watson, supra note 30 at 251.
78. See note 6 supra.
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proceed against insurers to obtain full recovery if the MLA statute is
enacted. Thus, under the MLA proposal, there is no need for a direct
action and a priori no need to extend the benefit of limitation to
insurers. Only under a system with an inadequate limitation fund,
and in a jurisdiction with a direct action statute, would insurers be
subjected to potential liability without the benefit of limitation.
Under the MLA proposal, however, no such vulnerability would
exist.
4. Salvors
Extension of the right to limit liability to salvors is logical and
promotes a sound purpose. Both the concept and law of salvage are
premised on the encouragement of such conduct. The removal of the
threat of unlimited liability is more consistent with the goal of the
doctrine and may promote this activity. Thus, extension of the right
to limitation to salvors by both the IMCO Convention 79 and the
MLA proposed statute 80 is a desirable modification.
C. Claims Subject to Limitation
Article Two of the MLA proposed statute, which enumerates the
claims subject to limitation, expands the category of such claims in
several important areas.81
1. Damage for Delay
Article I (b) of MLA statute is an extension of the current U.S.
law as it expands limitation for claims resulting from delay. This pro-
vision, which is nearly identical to the IMCO provision, is a justifi-
able expansion of limitation, since recovery for claims arising from
delay in transit are potentially substantial and thus are the very sort
of risk which limitation is designed to protect the shipowner against.
2. Wreck Removal
Both IMCO and the MLA statute extend the right of limitation
to wreck removal costs. 8 2 Under the current U.S. doctrine such ex-
79. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 1, para. 3.
80. The Act, supra note 32, art. 1, paras. 1, 3.
81. Id., art. 2.
82. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 1, paras. d, e; The Act, supra note 32,
art. 1, paras. 1(a), 1(d), 1(e).
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penses are denied the benefit of limitation. 83 These expenses are
also the sort which limitation is designed to protect against since they
are unpredictable, substantial, and greatly exceed the shipowner's in-
vestment in the vessel.
3. Personal Contract Doctrine
Article 2 (2) of the MLA statute is intended to overrule the per-
sonal contract doctrine. The concept of "personal. contract" emerged
from the Supreme Court's statement in Richardson v. Harmon 84 that
the Limitation Act left a shipowner "liable for his own fault, neglect
and contracts." 8 5 Although the exact dimensions of the doctrine are
unclear, the Supreme Court has made it clear that although a bill of
lading is not a personal contract, thereby permitting the shipowner to
limit liability, 86 a charter party is a personal contract precluding the
owner from limiting liability.8 7 The uncertainty engendered by this
doctrine is a sufficient consideration to warrant its abolishment.
D. The Limitation Fund
1. IMCO
In determining the limitation fund, the Convention utilizes a
formula based on the gross tonnage of the vessel, and reflects the
CMI's "guiding principle" that the limitation amounts reflect com-
mercial insurability. The IMCO limitation fund takes into considera-
tion the fluctuations of various currencies by expressing the amounts
83. See University of Texas v. United States, 1977 A.M.C. 2607 (5th Cir. 1977).
This case casts us adrift on muddied waters that lie at the convergence of two desul-
tary streams of 19th century thought. On the one hand, Congress sought to ensure
that navigable waterways remained free of obstructions, including sunken vessels-
thus the Wreck Act. On the other hand, Congress sought to ensure that American
shipping attract investment capital that the threat of unlimited economic exposure
might divert to England. Accordingly, it limited the shipowner's liability for losses
caused without his privity or knowledge by the operation of the vessel by enacting
the Limitation Act; Complaint of Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 1970 A.M.C. 1592
(N. D. Cal. 1970). Even though the owner of a vessel wrecked as the result of a
mutual fault collision may otherwise be entitled to limit its liability, the statutory
obligation to remove the wreck is not subject to limitation since the noncompliance is
within the owner's privity or knowledge.
84. 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
85. Id. at 106.
86. E.g., Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd., 278 U.S. 420
(1932).
87. E.g., Capital Transp. Co. v. Cambira Steel Co., 249 U.S. 334 (1919); Pendle-
ton v. Benner Line, 246 U.S. 353 (1918); Luchenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Refin-
ing Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
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in terms of special drawing rights (SDR).88 Examined in this light,
the IMCO Convention provides for substantially higher limitation
amounts than are currently available under the Limitation Act. 9
The IMCO Convention utilizes one formula to establish the
death/personal injury fund 9" and another for the property damage
fund. 9 1 While both operate on a system based on tonnage, the
IMCO proposal provides for a death/personal injury fund that is ap-
proximately 200 percent of the property damage fund. Nevertheless,
Article 6.2 provides that whenever the death/personal injury fund is
insufficient to satisfy its claimants, they may share ratably with the
property damage claimants from the latter fund.
The Convention uses a different formula for the establishment of
a limitation fund for passenger claims, reflecting the realization that a
passenger vessel of relatively low gross tonnage can carry a dispropor-
tionately large number of potential claimants.
9 2
88. The Convention's limitation formula is expressed in terms of units of account
or special drawing rights, which the Maritime Law Association of the United States
converted into meaningful figures whereby one SDR is equal to $1.2285. See Status
Report on Limitation of Liability Project, Mar. L. Ass'n. Doc. 612 at 6812-16 (March
27, 1978).
89. To illustrate this increase, the comparative limitation funds for a 50,000 ton
vessel lost in a major maritime disaster would be:
Limitation of Liability Act: $60 per ton x 50,000 tons
$3,000,000 total fund
IMCO Convention;
1. Personal injury and death claims
First 500 tons - = 333,000
2500 tons x 500 units of account = 1,250,000 units of account
27,000 tons x 333 units of account = 8,991,000
20,000 tons x 250 units of account = 5,000,000
15,574,000 x $1.2285 -
$ 19,132,713
2. Other claims and those unsatisfied from the above
First 500 tons = 167,000
29,500 tons x 167 units of account = 4,926,500 units of account
20,000 tons x 125 units of account = 2,500,000
7,593,500 x $1.2285 =
$ 9,328,640
Total IMCO Fund: $28,461,353.
90. The Convention, supra note 31, Art. 6, para. 1(a).
91. Id., Art. 6, para. 1(b).
92. To determine the limitation fund for passenger claims, the number of passen-
gers that the vessel is authorized to carry according to the ship's certificate is multi-
plied by a set amount of 46,666 units of account or approximately $57,000. The Con-
vention, supra note 32, Art. 7. In addition, it must be noted that this is not merely
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While at first glance the limitation fund for passenger claims,
with a maximum ceiling of $30,712,586 may seem sufficient, upon
closer scrutiny the fund is remarkably similar in its inadequacy to the
current American limits. Assuming under the Convention that a pas-
senger ship with 1500 authorized passengers and a limitation find of
the thirty million maximum perished at sea, the maximum recovery
per claimant, assuming all brought major personal injury or death
actions, would only amount to $20,475. 93 Although supporters of the
Convention will undoubtedly assert that it would be rare for all pas-
sengers to assert major death or personal injury claims, the relatively
low limits reflect a striking similarity to the insufficiency and inequity
of the Limitation Act. In rebuttal, even if all passengers did not assert
major claims, it is manifest that the IMCO limits are far too low.
Conversely, under the current U.S. limitation formula, a mer-
chant ship of approximately 17,750 tons with a crew of 71 seamen
would yield a maximum average fund of $15,000 if personal injury or
death claims were asserted by all the crew members. 9 4  Despite the
fact that it would be a rare occasion when all the crew members or
passengers would file a major clain, the present U.S. limitation fund
is grossly inadequate. In contrast to the $15,000 average limitation
fund per seaman under the US. formula, the IMCO Convention
would establish a fund of approximately $125,000 per seaman for a
vessel of 20,000 gross tons and a crew of 71 seamen.9, 5 While this is
a substantial improvement over the existing limits in the United
States, it is questionable whether even the IMCO amounts are really
adequate to provide for fair and equitable recoveries.
2. MLA Proposed Statute
a. Death and Personal Injury Claims
While Article Six of the MLA proposed statute is consistent with
the underlying rationale of the IMCO Convention that death and per-
$57,000 for each passenger, but rather the passenger capacity of the ship is used to
determine the limitation fund against which all passengers would proceed in the
event of a disaster.
93. 30,712,586 = $20,475.1500
94. 17,750 [tons] x $60/ton $15,000
71 [seamen]
95. 8,699,278 dollars = $125,482
71 [seamen]
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sonal injury claims should have a separate fund, it differs substantially
in its limitation formula. Unlike the Limitation Act which uses a value
formula, or the IMCO Convention which uses a gross tonnage for-
mula, the MLA limitation fund is based on the number of persons on
board the vessel at the time of the disaster.9 6 The value formula
suffers from the inherent flaw that in cases when the need is the
greatest, the fund is the least. Likewise, the gross tonnage formula
fails to take into consideration the economic reality that in many cases
smaller vessels have larger crews than the large vessels. 97 Thus, the
MLA death/personal injury fund is determined by the number of per-
sons actually on board the vessel multiplied by $200,000.98 Article
Six establishes one fund which is available to all persons with death
or personal injury claims arising out of the event, in contrast to IM-
CO's establishment of a separate fund for passengers based on the
number of passengers that the vessel was authorized to carry. 99
In an effort to give added protection to seamen, the MLA Article
Six fund provides an additional sum of up to $100,000 for each crew
member of the vessel for which limitation is sought. However, the
statute limits the availability of this reserve fund only to the crew
member or his personal representative and only to the extent that his
claim has not been fully satisfied from the primary fund. 100 Finally,
based on the Coast Guard's report concerning the number of deaths
and injuries in major disasters recently,"0 ' the Maritime Law Associa-
tion concluded that a one million dollar minimum fund was neces-
sary. 10 2 Thus, under the MLA proposed statute, a 10,000 ton vessel
with a crew of 45 would have a primary fund of $9 million, plus the
reserve fund of $4.5 million for a total death/personal injury fund of
$13.5 million. This is a significant improvement over IMCO's fund for
the identical vessel of $4,803,364 plus a theoretical possibility of some
additional recovery from the property damage fund.10 3
96. See Commentary, supra note 41, at 11.
97. Id.
98. The Act, supra note 32, art. 6.
99. The Convention, supra note 31, art. 7, para. 1.
100. The Act, supra note 32, art. 6, para. b.
101. See Memorandum of Major Marine Casualties by the United States Coast
Guard, Appendix B of this article.
102. The Act, supra note 32, art. 6, para. c.
103. MLA Proposed Statute;
$200,000 x 45 persons = $9,000,000 (primary fund)
$100,000 x 45 persons = $4,500,000 (reserve fund)
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b. Claims Other Than Death and Personal Injury
The current U.S. doctrine of determining the limitation fund by
the value of the vessel after the event carries the inherent flaw that in
cases of a major disaster, when the need is the greatest the fund is
the least. To circumvent this problem, the MLA statute uses the ton-
nage formula of the IMCO Convention for claims other than death
and personal injury,'0 4 with four major modifications.
First, the fund is expressed in U.S. dollars rather than special
drawing rights. 10 5 Second, as is evident from the chart below, the
MLA proposed statute dramatically increases the size of the fund for
smaller vessels.







































Third, in contrast to the Convention, the Article 7 Fund cannot be
invaded by the personal injury and death claimants who are restricted
IMCO Convention
First 500 tons = 333,000
2,500 tons x 500 units of acct. = 1,250,000
7,000 tons x 333 units of acct. = 2,331,000
10,000 tons = 3,914,000
3,914,000 units of account x $1.2285 = $4,808,364.
104. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
105. One special drawing right (SDR) equals $1.2285.
106. The Act, supra note 32, art. 7.
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to recovery from the Article 6 Fund.10 7  Finally, the MLA statute
establishes a minimum fund of $500,000, and a maximum fund of $25
million. 108
Viewed collectively, the two funds under the MLA proposed
statute provide for a more complete and equitable recovery for claim-
ants, while keeping pace with modern economic realities.
E. Pleasure Craft
1. IMCO Convention
Initally, it would appear that the IMCO Convention would
exclude small pleasure craft from limitation, not by specific proscrip-
tion, but as a practical matter because of the formula for the limita-
tion fund in Article Six. 109 However, upon more careful analysis,
such may not be the case.
In regard to the scope of application, Article 15 (2) states in rel-
evant part:
(2) A State Party may regulate by specific provisions of
national law the system of limitation of liability to be applied to
vessels which are:
(a) according to the law of that state, ships intended for navi-
gation on inland waterways;
(b) ships of less than 300 tons. 110
By stating that a country may regulate by national legislation
"vessels intended for navigation on inland waterways and ships of less
than 300 tons," it is obvious that the delegates intended for the Con-
vention to apply only to seagoing vessels, and that states would be
permitted to alter the terms of the Convention with regard to small
vessels of less than 300 tons, although such vessels would be covered
by the Convention unless the state explicitly provided to the con-
trary. "'l
This provision allows two possible courses of action for the
United States should it ratify the IMCO Convention, both of which
are undesirable. First, the United States could permit the IMCO
fund to also govern small pleasure craft. That course of action, how-
107. See Commentary, supra note 41, at 14-15.
108. The Act, supra note 32, art. 7, para. 1 (c).
109. See Burr, supra note 68, at 808.
110. The Convention, supra note 31, Art. 15, para 2.
111. See Watson, supra note 30, at 260.
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ever, would produce an inequitable result by singling out owners of
small vessels to establish a minimum limitation fund greatly in excess
of their investment in the ship. Further, the extension of limitation to
owners of pleasure craft is unwarranted. Permitting this class of
owner to limit will not promote shipping, trade, or commerce. Nor
will it provide a "necessary" subsidy to the U.S. shipping industry.
Second, if supporters of ratification would prefer to deal with small
vessels through the national legislation exception, as appears likely,
then it is incumbent upon this group to inform all interested parties
exactly how they plan to resolve this issue so that a well informed
decision can be made in the forthcoming debates over ratification.
2. MLA Proposed Statute
In developing the proposed statute, the working committee of
the Maritime Law Association was unable to arrive at a final solution
regarding whether or not to exclude pleasure craft from the right to
limit liability. The Association therefore decided to permit the joint
committees and the Association's membership to resolve this issue. 112
Despite arguments to the contrary, 113 this issue should be resolved
against extending the benefit of limitation to pleasure craft. First, the
underlying rationale for promulgation of the doctrine was to promote
the growth of maritime commerce in the United States, and to en-
courage the investment of capital in this industry. Yet, extension of
the benefit of limitation to pleasure craft will do nothing to promote
the reasons for the establishment of the doctrine nor the justifications
for its continuance today.
Second, inclusion of pleasure craft within the right to limit liabil-
ity would place an unwarranted limit on the recovery of death or
personal injury claimants. Under the proposed statute, the death/
personal injury fund is calculated by the number of persons actually
on board the vessel multiplied by $200,000, with a minimum of one
million dollars. L14
112. The words "except pleasure craft" have been placed in brackets in the statute
until the membership arrives at a final decision. See The Act, supra note 32, art. 1,
para 2.
113. See Commentary, supra note 41, at 14. Reasons cited in favor of granting
limitation to pleasure craft include: a workable definition of pleasure would be dif-
ficult to arrive at; that granting limitation to these owners will help sales in the
pleasure craft building industry and related businesses, and that the statute estab-
lishes adequate amounts in its limitation fund.
114. The Act, supra note 32, art. 6.
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Finally, there is no support for the contention that extension of
the right to limit liability to pleasure craft would promote the plea-
sure craft building industry and related businesses. Notwithstanding
the per annum expenditures on pleasure craft, 115 it is highly unlikely
that purchasers of pleasure craft seriously consider the ability to limit
liability should they be involved in a maritime disaster; or that sales
would decline merely because of a denial of the benefit of limitation.
None of the policy reasons behind limited liability are applicable to
pleasure craft. As such, those who own pleasure craft should accept
financial responsibility for their actions and thus should be denied the
right to limit liability.
III. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
To date, most discussions of limitation have used a tunnel vision
approach by restricting the available alternatives open to the United
States to either: 1) retention of the present limitation doctrine, 2)
complete abolition of limited liability, or 3) ratification of the IMCO
Convention. As noted above, the present U.S. limitation doctrine is
an anachronism. Likewise, complete abolition of limitation is undesir-
able. Such an action would place the United States at a serious com-
petitive disadvantage with other maritime powers. Moreover, ratifica-
tion of the IMCO Convention is not the answer to the limitation
problem. Although IMCO is an improvement over the present limita-
tion doctrine, there are four major disadvantages with the Convention
which, on balance, make ratification undesirable.
First, although the establishment of a fund based on tonnage is
an improvement over the status quo, the Convention establishes
limits that are too low. Thus, the Convention fails to provide a suffi-
cient fund from which tort claimants can recover. Second, the Con-
vention fails to enunciate a comprehensive scheme to deal with the
controversy surrounding limitation for pleasure craft. Third, while
abolition of the loose privity or knowledge standard in favor of the
tighter language of intent is a welcome change, the allocation of the
burden of proof upon the claimant is both unnecessary and unwise.
The "intent" standard establishes such an ironclad defense that it will
be rare for a claiment to defeat limitation. As such, it would have
been a sufficient quid pro quo to give claimants a significantly larger
limitation fund in exchange for the shipowners acquiring the intent
115. According to the National Association of Engine and Boat Manufacturers and
the Marketing Department of Marex, there were 9,740,000 pleasure crafts in the
United States ir 1975, with per annum retail expenditures of $4,800,000,000. Com-
mentary, supra note 41, at 5.
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standard. Further, placing the burden of proof upon claimants will
put a premium on ignorance for owners, and for those that are
knowledgeable as to the cause of the loss, it will provide an incentive
for concealment and noncooperation. Also, under IMCO, when the
exact cause of the loss cannot be determined, whatever slight chance
the claimant had to preclude limitation is automatically defeated. This
results in a windfall to those petitioning for limitation since they are
already guaranteed a substantial degree of certainty by the tighter
language used in the Convention. Finally, extension of the benefit of
limitation to insurers is unwarranted. Limitation should not be ex-
tended where it does not promote the underlying reasons for its
enactment or the justifications for its continuance today. Thus, al-
though the Convention is an improvement over the status quo, it
encompasses these four major disadvantages which cannot be re-
moved if it is to be ratified.
Further, supporters of ratification of the Convention allege that
there is a need for international uniformity which only their proposal
can satisfy. However, the potential for forum shopping in limitation
cases is augmented by the different standards for limitation as well as
the judicial attitudes toward limitation and the basic structural differ-
ences between the legal systems of the United States and European
countries. The Convention can do little to change the judicial at-
titudes and structural differences between various legal systems.
Further, enactment of the MLA statute would place the United
States in harmony with most other maritime nations of the world,
even those ratifying IMCO, without the disadvantages inherent in the
Convention. It is therefore apparent that of the four choices available
to the United States, only the enactment of the Maritime Law As-
sociation's proposed statute will provide a formula in which advan-
tages outweigh disadvantages.
IV. MERITS OF ADOPTING THE MLA STATUTE
Resolution of the question of limitation of liability requires a
formula that presents a comprehensive solution to the four major
problem areas in the current U.S. doctrine: 1) the loose privity or
knowledge standard; 2) the low limitation fund; 3) the controversy
surrounding extension of limitation to pleasure craft; and 4) the di-
lemma of direct action statutes or extension of the benefit of limita-
tion to insurers. To date, only the Maritime Law Association's pro-
posed statute has been able to present a comprehensive solution to
the problems of limitation, without containing inherent flaws itself.
Moreover, the MLA statute is particularly appealing because it is
MLA STATUTE ON LIMITATION
presented within the framework of a balancing approach, giving a
quid pro quo to all interested parties.
A. Trial Lawyers
During the past several years there has been a movement by the
Trial Lawyers of America Association to have Congress completely
abolish shipowners' limitation of liability. Their obvious reasoning for
such a proposal is that the elimination of limited liability would create
a potential for very large judgments for their clients, with correspond-
ingly higher contingent fees for themselves. Considering the dramatic
increase in no fault automobile legislation, such an economic analysis
by American trial lawyers is not surprising. As noted above, however,
complete abolition of limited liability would place the American mer-
chant marine at a competitive disadvantage in the international mar-
ketplace. The MLA statute would resolve this by maintaining limited
liability for owners of commercial vessels with a significantly larger
limitation fund, and by excluding pleasure craft from the benefit of
limitation. Thus the MLA statute gives a quid pro quo to both par-
ties; owners of commercial vessels are guaranteed the right to limita-
tion while trial lawyers have the potential for unlimited liability in
cases involving pleasure.
B. Shipowners
Shipowners allege that their industry could not withstand unlim-
ited liability. They assert that the resulting increased insurance rates
and the loss of concursus would drive the American merchant marine
out of the competitive market. Such an argument contains several
problems however. First, as Abraham Freedman said while General
Counsel to the National Maritime Union:
In the vast majority of cases under the present law the peti-
tions for limitation have been defeated, particularly where large
casualties are inflicted .... Accordingly, in these cases the ship-
owner is required to pay all damages in full .... In view of the
fact that most petitions to limit liability are denied, it is correct to
say that there will be little, if any, change in the insurance
rates. 116
A second problem with the insurance argument is that neither
the shipowners nor the insurers, who apparently have all the neces-
116. 3 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PROB. 105, 114 (1967).
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sary data at their disposal, have provided Congress or the public with
any specific data estimating the probable increase in insurance pre-
miums because of a change in the law of limitation. It is necessary for
these groups to substantiate their claims rather than making bold as-
sertions. The MLA statute recognizes both the insufficiency of the
present limitation fund and the problems that would be created by
complete abolition of limited liability. Thus, the proposed statute
guarantees the shipowners a greater certainty in limiting liability by
tighter language of wilful misconduct or intent in exchange for a sig-
nificantly larger limitation fund.
C. Tort Claimanis
It is difficult to reconcile the current movement in favor of com-
pensation for the injured with the realization that such claimants are
effectively denied recovery under the Limitation Act by a doctrine
promulgated over one hundred years ago. The MLA proposed statute
resolves this problem by establishing a significantly larger limitation
fund. Thus, both the shipowners and tort claimants are given a quid
pro quo. The shipowners are given a greater certainty in limiting
liability by the abandonment of the "privity or knowledge" standard
in exchange for a larger limitation fund and the allocation of burden
of proof upon the party seeking limitation.
D. Admiralty Lawyers
An elite group with a vested interest in limitation that has been
expending considerable manpower over the question of limited liabil-
ity includes the admiralty bar and the Maritime Law Association of
the United States. Their desire to extend the right of limitation to
insurers, who in many cases are their clients, is balanced against their
demand for a significant increase in the limitation funds. Their pro-
posals reflect a realization that the present limitation doctrine must
be modified to keep up with the times.
If steps are not taken to liberalize our limitation of liability law
... there is going to be public clamor for a law which does away
with limitation in its entirety and therefore, if we want to preserve
limitation in order to encourage investment in shipping, we should
try to keep up with the times and enact amendments which will
make limitation more acceptable to the courts and to the public at
large. 117
117. Address of Chairman Nicholas J. Healy III to Ass'n of Average Adjusters of
the United States, 1960 Annual Report, 313-13 (quoted in GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 9, at 824 note 13i).
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E. Insurers
Article 1 (5) of the proposed statute extends the benefit of limita-
tion to insurers in an effort to protect them from direct action stat-
utes. Because of this expansion, it is possible that shipowners could
purchase greater insurance coverage at reduced premiums. This
would provide equivalent benefits to both shipowners and insurers.
Shipowners could contract for liability insurance up to the maximum
and use that to pay off any claims and still have the hull insurance to
purchase a new vessel. Likewise the insurers could sell more insur-
ance policies for higher limits.
F. United States Public Policy
Finally, the federal government as an interested party itself must
make a decision in the near future regarding what formula for limita-
tion of liability should be used in the United States. The present
limitation is an anachronism. Likewise, even if statutory limitation of
liability were abolished, shipowners would probably still be able to
limit their liability through use of the corporate veil and single ship
incorporation. Further, as noted above, the IMCO Convention does
not present a comprehensive solution to the problem of limitation and
contains several inherent disadvantages of its own.
The question of limited liability must be viewed pragmatically.
Thus, it will be difficult for supporters of the Convention to lobby
sufficient support in the Senate for ratification when the U.S. delega-
tion refused to sign it and when special interest groups are supporting
passage of the MLA proposed statute instead. Considering all the
lobbying that will be done in Washington, it is exceedingly difficult to
imagine that the Senate would ratify the IMCO Convention while the
House was considering the MLA proposal.
VI. CONCLUSION
To date, the Maritime Law Association's proposed statute is the
only doctrine that presents a comprehensive solution to the four
major problem areas in the law of limitation without creating any new
ones. The statute balances the interests of all interested parties, giv-
ing to each a quid pro quo, while also promoting the public policy
goals of the United States. As such, it warrants serious consideration
for enactment within the United States.
